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PREFACE 
 
 Vigilantes have long been vilified, often with good reason, as with the racist 
lynchings of the Klu Klux Klan. But the origin of the term and the original American 
"vigilantes" in 1850s San Francisco were models of democratic action saving the 
community from an ineffective and corrupt government. And there has been a long line 
of groups who could fairly claim their conduct to be morally justified, albeit technically 
illegal. 
 In modern societies, citizens give up most of their natural right to defend 
themselves or to respond to wrongdoing, in return for a promise of protection and justice 
from the government. But what happens when government breaches that social 
contract and persistently fails in its promise? There are difficulties with citizens taking 
matters into their own hands, but it is hard not to empathize with people in desperate 
situations where law enforcement seems indifferent. And there are some persuasive 
moral arguments that people can make in support of some forms of constrained 
vigilantism. 
 One might hope that serious failures of justice and protection were rare, and that 
government takes seriously its obligation under the social contract. However, rightly or 
wrongly ordinary people believe they have reason to doubt the criminal justice system’s 
devotion to doing justice. In a wide range of rules and practices – what might be called 
the doctrines of disillusionment – the criminal justice system seems to many to advertise 
an indifference to the importance of doing justice: courts that feast on technicalities, 
treating criminal justice as if it were a game; judicial rules that suppress reliable 
evidence and thereby let serious offenders go free; decisionmakers allowed to use their 
discretion to avoid deserved punishment for serious offenses; and criminal law defenses 
that shield clearly guilty and blameworthy offenders from liability. 
 Ultimately, the doctrines of disillusionment tend to undermine the criminal justice 
system’s moral credibility with many ordinary people, and that loss in turn undermines 
the criminal justice system’s ability to harness the powerful forces of social influence 
and internalized norms. In other words, there are not only strong deontological reasons 
to be sympathetic to moral vigilante but also compelling instrumentalist crime-control 
reasons to pay attention to ordinary people’s disillusionment with a system they see as 
failing to give sufficient importance to doing justice. 
 While vigilantism is something considerably more nuanced than the evil 
incarnate that its Ku Klux Klan paradigm might suggest, it is not so easy to clearly mark 
out the importantly different categories of moral vigilantes and immoral vigilantes. An 
attempt to set out a code for the moral vigilante illustrates the complexity of the problem 
and the fuzzy lines that inevitably remain.  
And even if one could construct a clear detailed code of conduct, it is an 
inevitable weakness of vigilante action that, once the red line of official criminal 
prohibition has been crossed, it is easy – too easy – for even the well-meaning vigilante 
to lose track of the boundaries of moral justification. Perhaps even more troublesome, 
even if the vigilante is successful in staying within the bounds of moral justification given 
his situation, it is commonly the case that even moral vigilantism can be problematic for 
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the larger society. The bottom line is that official action is always to be preferred over 
vigilante action.  
But it does not follow that the moral vigilante must simply suffer in silence. First, 
this may not be possible. Strong feelings of disillusionment may spark action no matter 
what the law threatens. Further, asking moral vigilantes to suffer in silence is not only a 
poor crime-control strategy but, more importantly, it ought not to be asked. The 
government has obligations to its citizens under its social contract and is not free to 
simply choose not to perform them. The criminal justice system ought to take seriously 
its obligation to assure that justice is done and crime avoided whenever possible, so 
that people are never put in the position of having to consider moral vigilantism. 
But the real danger is not of hordes of citizens, frustrated by the system’s 
doctrines of disillusionment, rising up to take the law into their own hands. Frustration 
can spark a vigilante impulse but such classic aggressive vigilantism is not the typical 
response. More common is the expression of disillusionment in less brazen ways, by a 
more surreptitious undermining and distortion of the operation of the criminal justice 
system. 
Shadow vigilantes, as they might be called, can affect the operation of the 
system in a host of important ways. For example, when people act as classic vigilantes 
or exceed the legal rules for use of defensive force or when officials exceed their 
authority in dealing with offenders, shadow vigilantes can refuse to report the crime or to 
help investigators, or can refuse to indict as grand jurors or refuse to convict as trial 
jurors. Further, frustration with doctrines of disillusionment can lead politicians to urge 
legal reforms that seem to avoid failures of justice but that also overreach and produce 
regular injustices. 
 Shadow vigilantism can also be seen in the conduct of officials within the system, 
who feel morally justified in subverting the system because they see it as so regularly 
and indifferently producing failures of justice. Such subversion is apparent, for example, 
in refusing to prosecute vigilantes, police, or crime victims who stray beyond legal 
limitations on the use of force against aggressors, in police testilying to subvert search 
and seizure technicalities (and judicial toleration of it), and in prosecutorial overcharging 
to compensate for past perceived justice-failures. 
 The danger of shadow vigilantism is not simply in the systemic distortions that it 
provokes. The distortions have their own effect in further undermining the system's 
credibility and its crime-control effectiveness. For example, lenient sentencing provokes 
mandatory minimums, and search and seizure technicalities provoke testilying, but the 
excessiveness of mandatory minimums and the lost credibility from institutionalized 
testilying then in turn provokes "stop snitching" campaigns, which guarantee greater 
witness intimidation, greater criminality, and less justice. 
 We would all be better off if this dirty war had never started. Systemic failures 
of justice, shadow vigilantes’ distorting response, and blowback from those distortions, 
end in more crime and more failures of justice – this is the downward spiral. 
 The only way to effectively stop that tragic cycle is for the criminal justice system 
to publicly commit itself to the importance of doing justice, and avoiding injustice, at all 
costs. That means avoiding application of the doctrines of disillusionment where there is 
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no compelling societal interest to do so or where the interest could be as effectively 
promoted through a non-justice-frustrating means.  
The only way to prevent the downward spiral of lost credibility is to acknowledge 
the importance of doing justice both as an essential ideal and as a practical necessity. 
Robinson, Vig Ch10 August 9, 2016 
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CHAPTER 10 
SHADOW VIGILANTE OFFICIALS MANIPULATE AND DISTORT TO 
FORCE JUSTICE FROM AN APPARENTLY RELUCTANT SYSTEM 
 
 Frustration with failures of justice, and the shadow vigilante impulse that it 
provokes, is found not only among civilians but also among criminal justice professionals. 
And police, prosecutors, judges, and others have an even greater opportunity than 
civilians to subvert or manipulate the criminal justice process in an effort to force justice 
from it.  
For example, it is not unusual for police to circumvent technical search and seizure 
requirements by lying in court about the circumstances of the search or seizure – what the 
police call “testilying.” Prosecutorial shadow vigilantism is shown in, for example, a 
disinclination to charge civilians or police who make culpable mistakes in confrontations 
with wrongdoers. It is also shown in prosecutorial overcharging of an offender to 
compensate for past offenses that went unpunished. And it is clear that judges tolerate 
much of the above, and add in a few manipulations of their own. These players take the 
system's repeated failures of justice as their moral justification for subverting and 
manipulating it – to force from it the justice to which it often seems indifferent. 
 Consider two examples of police testilying and the circumstances that provoked 
them. 
 
Police Testilying to Subvert the Exclusionary Rule 
 Distorting a Warrant Affidavit to Catch a Sexual Predator and Serial Murderer. 
Bill Bradford is a sexual psychopath.1 His first sexual crime occurs in 1972 during his 
mid-twenties. Bradford tries to force his penis into a 17-year-old-girl=s mouth and then 
masturbates onto her breasts. In response to the girl=s cries, Bradford shouts that Ahe 
always wanted to do it so he did.@2 
 Two years later, Bradford and a 15-year-old begin an intimate relationship. During 
the relationship, Bradford beats his girlfriend on a weekly basis, sometimes forcing her to 
have intercourse with him during the assaults. The girl becomes pregnant. During 
pregnancy, Bradford tries to kill the baby by slamming her belly into a door and once the 
baby is born he tries to kill it several more times, twice throwing it against the wall and 
once by tying a windbreaker around its face. Over the years the pattern continues: 
Bradford treats a woman brutally, is arrested, convicted, and soon free again. 
 In the summer of 1984, while out on bail and awaiting trial for rape, Bradford 
assaults Shari Miller, a twenty-one-year-old struggling to make it on her own. She has 
held various jobs in the past including being a bartender at the Meat Market, a popular bar 
in Los Angeles. Miller tells her mother that she is going to get a job as a model for a 
photographer and heads out at 3 p.m. that afternoon. Bradford goes with Miller into the 
desert, takes various nude photographs of her, and then strangles her to death. He then 
mutilates the body, removing her nipples and various other pieces of flesh. 
 More than a week later an office worker who has parked behind his workplace in 
the alley notices a foul smell. He spots a large bundle covered by a quilt, soaked in blood, 
from which a hand is protruding. Identified initially as Jane Doe No. 60, the body is that of 
Sheri Miller. 
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 Tracey Campbell is a 15-year-old girl who has moved to Los Angeles from 
Montana with her mother. She is attending a local junior high school. During the summer 
she is in charge of the housework in the small studio apartment she shares with her 
mother, sister, brother, and an older male cousin. This is the same complex that Bradford 
lives in. On July 12, one of Bradford=s housemates hears Bradford and Campbell talking 
and hears Bradford say he has a job for Campbell. Bradford takes her out to that same 
spot in the desert, photographs her, and then strangles her to death; he leaves the body 
to rot in the desert heat. 
 That night, when the rest of Campbell=s family arrives home, the apartment is 
locked and the cleaning has not been done. They ask around the apartment complex to 
find out if anyone has seen Tracey. When they ask Bradford=s housemates, they are told 
that the two had been together but that he is currently in Orange County. The next 
morning Campbell=s mother files a missing person’s report at the police station. Her 
cousin goes to check in with Bradford but he is still not at home and his car is still missing 
from the garage. When a friend of Bradford=s calls the apartment he is told by one of his 
housemates that they are worried because Bradford had Ataken the little girl next door the 
previous day and was not yet home.@3  
 On July 14, the LAPD interview Bradford in his apartment concerning Campbell. 
Bradford tells the officer that she had come to his apartment to use the phone, and that he 
had then gone and dropped her off to buy cigarettes and hitchhike to the beach. Two days 
later in a follow up interview he gives an almost identical account and consents to a 
search of his apartment and car. The police examine items in the living room, kitchen, hall 
closet and vehicle, but do not find anything significant.  
 The investigation and search continue. Potential suspects are cleared and leads 
turn out to go nowhere. Bradford remains the main suspect due to his connection to the 
girl immediately before her disappearance and his long rap sheet of previous sexual and 
violent assaults. On July 31, pursuant to a valid warrant, LAPD officers arrest Bradford 
and execute a more thorough search of his apartment and vehicle. This time, they recover 
numerous Polaroids and negatives from which they recognize photos of Jane Doe No. 
60. The police match the girl in some of the photographs to the dead body they had found 
earlier in the month and soon determine that Jane Doe No. 60 is Sheri Miller.  
 Over the course of the next two days, the police interrogate Bradford for over 11 
hours. They ask him about his connection to Miller, to which he responds that he had 
known her for years and that she had wanted to get into modeling. Knowing that he was a 
photographer, she had asked him to help her build a portfolio. He admits to taking those 
photographs on July 1 and says he has not seen her since. He claims he was at 
Huntington Beach on July 4 watching the tall ships. When asked about Campbell he gives 
a similar account to his earlier statements. On August 3, after being held for three nights, 
he is released from custody because the police do not have enough evidence to link him 
to the crimes. 
 On August 11, a body is found in the desert at the location Bradford is known to 
have previously visited for a camping trip. The location also matches the background for 
some of the seized photos of Miller modeling. Five days later, the police formally identify 
the body as Tracey Campbell. The worst fears of everyone are now confirmed, the police 
now have a double homicide on their hands. Because the methods of causing death are 
identical and the location is one known to have been visited by Bradford, the previous 
suspicions of the police seem to be confirmed. 
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 The police have a problem, however. While it is more clear to them than ever that 
Bradford is their multiple murderer, they do not have sufficient new evidence that will 
allow them to obtain a warrant to search his apartment for third time and to arrest him a 
second time. Yet, they have no other means of making a case against Bradford that will 
prevent another killing. Their warrant application must have a stronger showing of 
probable cause for yet another search than they have had in the past.  
 Sensing that a serial killer might escape their grasp and kill again, Detective 
Charles Worthen, who assisted with the July 31 search warrant, does what he believes he 
needs to get the warrant. In the warrant application, Worthen leaves out certain pieces of 
information. He leaves out information that Miller was seen alive after June 30, even 
though several of her friends reported this. He asks for authorization to search for a silver 
spoon ring, blue cut off shorts, and any articles of clothing as seen in a series of attached 
photographs, even though some of these items are already in police inventory from the 
previous search of Miller=s car. Finally, he mentions the two previous searches only in the 
appendix rather than in the main application itself. The tactics work and the warrant is 
granted. 
 On August 16, the LAPD again arrest Bradford and transport him to the police 
station to be interviewed. After being read his Miranda rights, he initially refuses to speak 
without a lawyer, but then Bradford waives that right and agrees to an interview. He sticks 
to his original stories about each girl. When asked how it could be possible that 
Campbell=s body was found almost in the exact same location as the photo shoot for 
Miller, Bradford responded AI can=t explain it to you.@4 When the police ask if he has 
murdered either girl he replies ANo sir.@5 
 Using the newly-issued warrant, the police search his home and vehicle for the 
third time. In the hall closet they find a wristwatch flecked in paint similar to the one Miller 
is wearing in some of her photographs. In a closet, they find a portion of white rope, 
numerous photographs and documents, and several items believed to be owned by 
Miller. The rope is found to make an impression identical to those in the ligature marks on 
both victims’ necks. They have found the murder weapon. In his automobile, the floor mat 
in the trunk tests positive with luminol and phenolphthalein, which indicate the possible 
presence of blood. 
 As a result of the items seized during the latest search, the collection of evidence 
against Bradford is very strong. The prosecution now has the murder weapon and several 
possessions of the victims found in Bradford’s house. Bradford is charged with two counts 
of first-degree murder, goes on trial, and is found guilty of both counts. (During Bradford=s 
closing testimony in sentencing he says, AThink of how many you don=t even know 
about.@6 The jury sentences him to death. Bradford appeals his conviction, citing the 
police misconduct in obtaining the final warrant. Some evidence is excluded but 
Bradford’s conviction is affirmed.7) 
 It seems likely that Detective Worthen wrote the application for the final warrant 
that led to the conviction in a way that was intentionally misleading. Yet, in his own mind, 
the deception no doubt seemed justifiable, given the justice-frustrating nature of the 
search and seizure exclusionary rules and the real danger that this sadistic serial 
murderer-rapist might escape conviction and punishment. 
 Exceeding Search and Seizure Rules to Catch a Child Murder. In the Columbia 
Heights section of Washington D.C., on the evening of November 1, 1969, five-year-old 
Penny Sellers and her older sister Denise visit the apartment of their grandfather, Robert 
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Dennis. Also present there is a neighbor, William Sheard, who gives the girls candy and 
lets them play with his puppy, as he has done in the past. Around 9:30 p.m., the girls have 
moved to watch television in the basement apartment of a friend. Penny leaves to go back 
to Sheard's apartment to play with his puppy again. It is the last time her family ever sees 
her. 
 After about an hour, her grandfather asks Sheard if he knows where Penny is and 
is told that she Ahad gone up the street with a man.@ 8 At the grandfather's request, 
Sheard calls the police. The police arrive at about 11:00 p.m., having been advised to 
contact Aa Sheard.@9 Upon meeting Sheard officers are informed by him that a child is 
missing, that he has telephoned the police, and that he had been the last person to see 
the child. One hour later, police find Penny=s body amid debris on the floor of a garage 
near the apartment building. Penny=s genital area is exposed and bloody. A later autopsy 
reveals that she has been raped and died due to asphyxiation from suffocation. Police 
also find her underpants in the alley near the garage and one of her shoes on the back 
porch of the house next door. 
 The police chief orders a lock down of the apartment complex and for all male 
residents to be questioned. During the question, officers are to also make a visual search 
for blood in the open living areas of their apartments. Officers Shuler and Jones are 
assigned to question Sheard’s apartment, as he is apparently the last person to see 
Penny alive.  
 Officer Shuler knocks on the door and identifies himself as a police officer. When 
Sheard answers the door, they immediately become suspicious because Sheard has 
fresh scratches on his face, looks as though he has just taken a bath, is wearing fresh but 
heavily wrinkled clothing, and his overall behavior is odd. Believing that Sheard might 
hide or destroy vital evidence if they wait to get a warrant, the officers are anxious to enter 
and examine his apartment.  
 Officers Shuler advises Sheard that a small child has been killed and that he and 
his partner, Officer Jones, would like to come inside to talk with him. Sheard later testifies 
that he did not authorize the officers to come into his apartment but that they simply 
barged in without permission. Officer Shuler testifies that Sheard was Afriendly@ and said, 
ACome in, come in, I'd like to do all I can to find out.@ Later, however, Officer Shuler 
testifies during a motion to suppress evidence that he does not remember exactly what 
Sheard had said. Officer Jones testifies, AWell, he just stepped back. And I don't 
remember if he said, come in, but I was under the impression that we were to enter the 
room by his attitude.@10 
 After the officers enter the apartment, they observe that the room is in a state of 
disarray: candy is strewn about on the floor and a large damp burned area is evident on 
the mattress of a bed. One of the officers leaves to summon their superiors and the other 
conducts a plain view search of the area. The officer supposedly finds in plain view a pair 
of dark green pants with blood stains sitting perfectly on top of a hamper. 
 Authorities seize the pants and other evidence and take Sheard to the nearby 
precinct. A benzidine test reacts positively to the pants thing is being blood. A test of 
Sheard’s right hand and penis also reveals blood. Chemical analysis reveals blood on 
Sheard's jacket, the dark green slacks, the blanket and bedspread, and Penny=s dress 
and slip is type O blood (Sheard blood is type A blood; Penny=s was type O). Fibers from 
the bedspread and blanket are discovered on Penny=s dress and slip, on all of Sheard's 
seized clothing, and in scrapings from the heads of both Sheard and Penny. 
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 With the staggering amount of evidence against Sheard, a grand jury indicts him 
on February 2, 1970 for the rape-murder of Penny. The indictment includes four counts: 
felony murder, first degree murder, rape, and taking indecent liberties with a minor. 
Sheard is found guilty and sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty years to life on the 
felony-murder count and of ten-to-thirty years on the rape count. 
 It seems clear that the two officers – and perhaps even their superiors – made a 
conscious choice to exceed the search and seizure rules and to hide their violation 
because they believed it was necessary to find the rapist-murderer of a 5-year-old little girl 
where the evidence of the crime would otherwise quickly be destroyed by the perpetrator. 
 Police officers morally justify their lying in court to compensate for what they see 
as improper rules that regularly lead to failures of justice B complex rules that have 
"metastasized into a dizzying array of formalistic doctrines and subdoctrines."11 Harvard 
law professor Alan Dershowitz explains, Aalmost all police lie about whether they violated 
the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants.@12 Even police officials concede that 
police lying in court, especially to justify improper searches, is not uncommon.13 It has 
earned its own label, "testilying.@ The term was coined by New York City police officers, 
apparently to help them justify in their own minds why it was different from normal lying 
under oath B while not legally justified, it was morally justified.14 AWhen an officer is 
deceptive in court, the rationale goes, he is 'not quite lying' but 'not quite testifying 
truthfully and completely' either. Testilying is seen as a middle ground between pure 
honesty and pure dishonesty.@15 
 One Officer caught lying under oath said it was Astandard procedure@ and used to 
Acounterbalance the loopholes used by drug dealers to evade the police.@16 An empirical 
study by Myron Orfield in Chicago concludes that "virtually all the officers admit that the 
police commit perjury, if infrequently, at suppression hearings."17 The study claimed that 
up to 76% of the officers surveyed had "shaded" facts in order to establish probable 
cause.18 They not only lie occasionally, but, some claim, commit perjury in 20 to 50% of 
cases where police have to testify regarding Fourth Amendment (exclusionary rule) 
issues.19  
 Most famous among the examinations of police perjury is the 1994 Mollen 
Commission Report on the New York Police Department: "Police perjury and falsification 
is a serious problem facing the department and the criminal justice system."20 Such 
perjury is "probably the most common form of police corruption . . . particularly in 
connection with arrests for possession of narcotics and guns.@21  
 The Mollen Commission Report spoke to the reasons for the officers' willingness to 
lie: "In their view, irregardless of the legality of the arrest, the defendant is in fact guilty 
and ought to be arrested."22 It explained that the officers were frustrated with the legal 
rules that protected criminals from search and seizure, because the rules were perceived 
as "unrealistic rules of law."23 Officers also expressed frustration in their "inability to stem 
the crime in their precinct through legal means."24 They held a strong belief that perjury 
was acceptable because it was necessary to stem the tide of crime, and such was "'doing 
God's work' B doing whatever it takes to get a suspected criminal off the streets."25 
 Other writers have made the same point: "Police view perjury as a necessary 
means to achieve the ends of justice. Constitutional rules B particularly the Exclusionary 
Rule B are viewed as technicalities that 'let the criminal . . . go free because the constable 
has blundered.'"26 One study found that testilying began soon after cases where 
dismissed under the 1961 exclusionary rule holding in Mapp v. Ohio.27 To police, Athere is 
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a deep-seated disregard for what they consider to be silly little laws made by silly little 
Supreme Court in a backroom far removed from the dangerous streets they are trying to 
bring order into."28 
 Presumably judges, like others in the system, are well aware of the testilying. Yet 
some may share the shadow vigilante sympathy motivating the lying, and thus, while no 
doubt unhappy about perjury in their court, play along with the game and accept the 
testimony as sufficient to justify the search or the arrest. As Alan Dershowitz reports, 
when officers offer perjured testimony, the judge "shakes his head in knowing frustration, 
but accepts the officers' account as credible.@29 A series of interviews revealed that 75% 
of judges, 100% of public defenders, and 65% of prosecutors Abelieved that judges 
sometimes fail to suppress evidence when they know police searches are illegal.@30 
 This is a sad state of affairs but in some ways is a predictable development as the 
collection of outrageous results from the law=s "technicalities" accumulate (as in Eyler, 
Ignatow, Healy, and other cases in Chapter 3). As the law increasingly loses moral 
credibility with the community, it becomes increasingly easier for shadow vigilantes to 
justify the subversion of what they see as an immoral system. It is probably no 
coincidence that "testilying@ is most frequently associated with satisfying the technicalities 
of search and seizure law. The same officer who feels comfortable lying about which side 
of a house=s threshold he was on when he made a drug seizure, might think it abhorrent to 
lie about a matter related to the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
 Just as police officers morally justify their testilying, so too do prosecutors 
manipulate the system out of frustration with what they see as the system’s common 
indifference to doing justice. This view frequently plays itself out for some prosecutors 
when they are presented with classic vigilantes trying to provide the justice that the 
system does not. Consider two examples. 
 
Prosecutor Reluctance to Try Some Vigilantes 
 Vigilantes Chase Down a Suspected Rapist. On May 31st, 2009, Jose 
Carrasquillo and a female friend buy four bottles of PCP, some cocaine, and liquor, and 
party the entire night.31 As the party spills into the early hours of the next morning, 
Carrasquillo=s friend decides to go home with another man, infuriating him. He begins 
prowling the neighborhood of Kensington, a lower income neighborhood in Northeast 
Philadelphia. Just after 7 a.m. he spots a sixteen-year-old girl walking to school. He 
approaches her, tells her he thinks she is sexy, and grabs her breast. The student flees to 
the safety of her school. 
 An hour later and a few blocks away, Carrasquillo comes across a pair of girls, two 
sisters. The 11-year-old is dropping the four-year old at daycare. Carrasquillo threatens to 
shoot the older sister and takes to an isolated alley where he rapes her repeatedly. After 
he flees, the girl picks herself up and manages to stumble to the street, crying for help. 
Neighbors find her bloody and screaming in the street and immediately call 911. She is 
hospitalized for 30 days and undergoes reconstructive surgery to repair the extensive 
damage inflicted upon her. 
 Video cameras on the street and schools show Carrasquillo with the girl. He is no 
stranger to the police as he has been arrested seventeen times in the past, often for drug 
related charges. Unable to immediately locate Carrasquillo, on June 2 the police post 
flyers in the area with his photo, stating that he is a person of interest in the recent rape 
case. Members of the community go out looking for him, worried about the safety of their 
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children and angry that one of their children has been raped in broad daylight on her way 
to school. 
 One group spots Carrasquillo on the street. A nearby shop surveillance camera 
records the incident. The group of neighbors chase the man down, knock him to the 
ground, and pummel him with their fists and feet. One man hits him several times with a 
large board. The police arrive and take Carrasquillo into custody. He is sent to the hospital 
where he remains in critical condition for several days.  
 The American Civil Liberties Union to pressures local law enforcement to file 
charges against the community members who beat the rapist, pointing out that the 
neighbors went beyond simply apprehending and holding Carrasquillo. ACLU attorney 
Mary Roper states, AIt's shocking that the police are not going to do anything in response 
to what is essentially mob violence against this guy.@32 
 However, District Attorney Seth Williams, decides not to arrest or press charges 
against any of the neighbors. John McNesby, president of the local Fraternal Order of 
Police, explains that the authorities do not endorse this kind of violence, but they also 
understand the tumult within the community and appreciate their help in taking this 
Asavage beast off the street.@33 Two of the men are actually given a $11,500 reward for 
helping to catch Carrasquillo. Mayor Michael Nutter also weighs in on that matter. He 
echos the Commissioner=s sentiments by stating that the city does not condone 
Avigilantism out in our street, but it=s indicative of the anger and compassion that many of 
our citizens have. It=s a further demonstration that Philadelphians care passionately about 
this city, about our quality of life, and certainly about our children.@34 
 Philadelphia Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey says, “it's something that we 
certainly don't want people taking the law into their own hands.@35 However, he also tells 
reporters,  
 
To attack an 11-year-old girl and – I mean, he injured her pretty badly. I went to the 
hospital and saw her today and it's just something that should've never happened. 
It's good to have him off the street. People can take a sigh of relief. We still have a 
lot of work to do, but this is an individual who's been in contact with the police 
numerous times before.36 
 
As the Commissioner mentions, the fact that Carrasquillo had long been a problem that 
the authorities seemed unable to do anything about helped explain their willingness to 
quietly condone, and protect, the vigilantes in this case. 
 No Prosecution of Vigilantes Who Beat a Child Rapist. Jane Doe grows up in the 
neighborhood of Hubbard Farms in southwest Detroit, raised by her single mother.37 
When she is eight years old, her mother dies and neighbors across the street and, in fact, 
the whole neighborhood pitches in raise Jane, calling her Aa daughter of the 
community.@38 The community feels particularly protective of Jane in part because she 
has Down’s Syndrome. She is often be seen on her front porch, dancing and singing 
along with the radio. 
 On July 8, 2013, at age fifteen, Jane gets her first job at the local Café Con Leche. 
She walks the four blocks to and from work twice a week. These small shifts are a 
stepping stone for Jane to gain more independence. Her employer describes her as a 
hard worker. Less than two weeks later, on July 17, she does not show up for the start of 
her shift. Her employer becomes concerned and calls her guardians, who tell him that she 
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has already left for work. When she finally arrives at work, Jane simply tells her boss that 
she has been with a friend. 
 Later that night, Jane confides to her adopted parents that she has been raped. 
Ramiro Sanchez, aged forty-three, approached her and asked her to come inside his 
apartment. Once inside, he disrobed, kissed, and raped her. He then took nude photos of 
her on his cell phone. After the attack, Jane quickly dressed and went to work, not 
knowing what else to do. Her parents immediately notify the police, they provide 
Sanchez’s address and his description  
 Jane, her parents, and the community anxiously await an investigation and 
charges to be pressed. It is not until two days later that a rape kit is finally administered. 
Several days later, on July 26, the parents are appalled to still see Sanchez walking 
around free. They send out a chain email through the tightknit community describing the 
rape and rapist. On July 29, the community receives some reassuring news; a person 
reports seeing Sanchez being led out of his apartment by police. But just two days later he 
is released without any charges. They are told that the investigation is ongoing, but the 
community sees apathy and inattention. They are angry. A fifteen-year old-daughter of 
their community with Down’s Syndrome has been raped, and she needs support. 
 Fifteen days after the rape on August 1, community leaders distribute flyers with a 
ARapist Warning@ and several pictures of Sanchez. Storefronts along the main street of 
the neighborhood put them up in their front windows. Tensions and frustrations continue 
to build and upon hearing that the rape kit has not yet even been processed by the state 
police, the community explodes. A Facebook thread on the incident has a post that 
states: 
 
AATTENTION/WARNING: this piece of shit u see in this flyer RAPED A 16 YR OLD 
GIRL IN OUR NEIGHBORHOOD !!! . . . me personally, if i seen him, id call the 
cops then i would beat the shit out of him myself till the cops arrive. I HATE 
WORTHLESS SCUM LIKE THIS. STAND UP FOR YOUR HOOD.@39 
 
 On Monday August 5 around 1 p.m., Sanchez is spotted walking along the main 
street. A man rides up on a bicycle, jumps off, and while beating the man shouts, AYou like 
raping little girls?@40 Sanchez manages to escape and run down the street where he is 
attacked by a larger group of people. The crowd kicks and beats him until police arrive. 
Sanchez is taken to the hospital where he is treated for injuries. Another post goes up on 
Facebook describing how Aa friend of mine caught him@ and claims that this was AGREAT 
NEWS FOR SOUTHWEST DETROIT... well...thanks to EVERYONE WHO SHARED 
THE FLYER AND SPREAD THE WORD.@41 
 Wayne County Prosecutor Kym Worthy does not seek to arrest anyone in 
connection with the beatings. Jerome Warfield, a member of Detroit=s civilian commission 
that oversees police says, AWe do understand that the neighbors were enraged.@42 He 
went on to warn though that Avigilantism cannot be accepted when you=re impeding upon 
somebody=s rights.@43 The community is torn between praising the actions of the vigilante 
mob who finally delivered some justice and condemning them as criminals themselves.44 
Although it is clear who participated in the beatings, no charges are ever brought. 
 We have previously noted other examples of prosecution decisions to not 
charge vigilantes. Recall George Zimmerman's killing of unarmed teenager Trayvon 
Martin, discussed in Chapter 9. No charges were filed by the local authorities until the 
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national press focused on the racial aspect of the case. The same was true in the case of 
Bernard Goetz unnecessarily shooting Darrell Cabey in the subway car and of the beating 
of Rodney King in Los Angeles, also discussed in Chapter 9. Whatever one may think of 
how the vigilantes should ultimately be dealt with, the potentially controversial 
circumstances suggest that at least some public examination of the events would be 
useful. Yet prosecutors regularly forgo filing charges unless forced to do so by media 
attention. 
 Prosecutor manipulation of the system works in reverse as well, overcharging 
rather than undercharging a case where the system has regularly failed to give an 
offender justice in the past. When they finally get hold of a justice-avoiding offender, it is 
not uncommon for prosecutors to seriously overcharge the violator’s offenses or grossly 
exaggerate their claim of an appropriate sentence, justified in their minds by the system’s 
past failures to do justice. Consider an example. 
 
Prosecutorial Overcharging to Make up for Past Failures of Justice 
 Finally Getting Something on a Career Criminal. Edward Augustine, living in New 
Orleans, has had numerous run-ins with the police, but they rarely end in conviction and 
punishment.45 He has a single conviction for attempted possession of a firearm with a 
controlled dangerous substance. He has been through the Arevolving door@ of the criminal 
justice system many times.46 Police regularly arrest him on drug or weapons charges, but 
he will later walked back out on the street. Sometimes it is because the police are unable 
to find witnesses willing to testify against him. In other instances, prosecutors do not 
proceed because at the time they have limited prosecution resources and Ahigher profile@ 
cases in greater need of their efforts.47  
 In 2008, the new District Attorney, Leon Cannizzaro, has a different attitude. 
Cannizzaro makes it office policy that no case is too insignificant to try and pursue. He 
makes it his mission to increase the percentage of cases his office will pursue from 50% 
to 90%. 
 On January 7, 2011, a New Orleans police officer observes a car make an unlawful 
right turn at a red light. The officer turns on his lights and siren to pull the car over, but the 
car speeds away. The officer follows the silver Sonata and, as he pulls up beside it, he 
sees the driver, Augustine, dumping white powder out of the car window. The officer 
believes the substance to be some form of illegal narcotics, and requests and receives 
permission to pursue the vehicle as necessary. 
 The officer chases Augustine for several blocks, but stops when Augustine enters 
a one-way street. Augustine accidentally hits another vehicle. Augustine flees. The officer 
pursues him on foot. As Augustine attempts to climb a fence in a nearby alley, the officer 
tases him and places him under arrest. Later, the passenger in the car that Augustine hit 
dies from his crash injuries. 
 Upon returning to the scene of the crash, the officer learns that Augustine has 
killed the passenger in the other vehicle, a college freshman who has just returned home 
for the Christmas holidays. The officer also finds numerous packages of heroin in 
Augustine’s possession. It also comes to light that the car being driven by Augustine has 
been reported missing by its owner, the mother of Augustine=s girlfriend.  
 District Attorney Cannizzaro is unhappy that this career criminal has been allowed 
to pass through the system on so many occasions without facing any serious punishment. 
He believes that by not aggressively prosecuting earlier narcotics cases, the system was 
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in effect Acreating monsters.@48 He is determined to pursue Augustine aggressively to try 
to make up for past failings of the office. 
 He charges Augustine with manslaughter for causing the death in the accident, for 
which Augustine ultimately gets, at his urging, a 50 year sentence. He also charges him 
with possession with intent to distribute illegal drugs – the drugs Augustine dumped out 
the window – and, again at his urging, Augustine gets an additional sentence of 50 years. 
Cannizzaro learns that the car that Augustine was driving belonged to his girlfriend’s 
mother. While he did not have her express permission to drive it on that occasion, the 
woman does not wish to press charges, but Cannizzaro does nonetheless, and thereby 
gets another 20 years added onto Augustine sentence, for a total sentence of 120 years – 
a sentence several times longer than what even an intentional murder would typically 
get.49 
 In this form of shadow vigilantism by prosecutors (and judges), the officials feel 
morally justified in manipulating the system in order to compensate for past values of 
justice.  
Prosecutorial overcharging is of two sorts: vertical overcharging, in which the 
prosecutor charges offenses for which he has insufficient proof to convict, and horizontal 
overcharging, in which he charges a series of overlapping offenses arising from the same 
criminal act.50 In the latter type, prosecutors charge every offense for which a defendant 
might theoretically satisfy the offense definition, no matter how overlapping the offenses 
may be. Thus, a prosecutor might take a standard rape case B using force to compel 
intercourse B and add on "assault, kidnapping, gross sexual imposition, etc."51 This is 
made possible because most American criminal codes, in which the state’s criminal laws 
are collected, have a vast collection of overlapping offenses,52 as legislatures have been 
constantly adding new offenses, sometimes making the code seven or eight times longer 
than its original Model-Penal-Code-based form but without substantially expanding its 
coverage.53 
 The forests of overlapping offenses exist in large part because prosecutors have 
politically promoted them. Prosecutors have put political muscle into supporting a 
constant stream of new offenses that typically are just added on top of the old. To protect 
this ability to bring multiple charges, they have repeatedly opposed criminal code reforms 
that would streamline codes and eliminate unnecessary overlaps. For example, in a new 
criminal law codification was undertaken in Illinois in 2003, which had as one of its primary 
aims the consolidation of overlapping offenses,54 the recodification was ultimately 
blocked by the political opposition of prosecutors.55 The prosecutors sponsored instead a 
new reform commission that kept the redundancies in the current code.56 
 Prosecutors= moral justification for excessive charging might rest on any or all of 
several different claims, the same sorts of claims heard from police to justify their 
testilying: First, the criminal justice process has so many barriers to an offender getting 
the liability and punishment he deserves that such excess is needed just to end up with 
something that approximates what is really deserved.57  
Further, it makes sense to try to get more liability and punishment than an offender 
deserves for the case at hand because, given the gross ineffectiveness of the system, the 
offense at hand is probably just the tip of the iceberg of the offenses he has actually 
committed.58  
 Finally, many people care little if the overcharging generates liability that is 
undeserved for both present and unpunished past offenses. That is not something that 
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ought to be a concern to prosecutors because the criminal justice system has given up 
any pretense about being a search for justice. It is simply a system of mutual combat 
between defense counsel and prosecutors, with winners and losers, the goal of which is 
to always win and never to lose. Just as defense counsel see their job as always getting 
the least punishment they can for their guilty clients, the prosecutors, in a symmetrical 
fashion, should see their job as getting as much as they can for guilty defendants.59 
 Strategic overcharging might seem to the uninitiated to be too unethical to be done 
openly. But the increasing game-like features of the system have dulled participants’ 
sensibilities. Indeed, one need only look at similar manipulative conduct by federal judges 
before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 stopped the practice. Federal law at the time 
required that all offenders be eligible for early release by the United States Parole 
Commission no later than after serving one-third of their sentence. Judges who bridled at 
this early release could, and did, short-circuit the system by simply determining the 
sentence they really wanted, then tripling it.60 Thus, the offender would become eligible 
for release only after serving the full term the judge thought appropriate. Prosecutors may 
be making similar sorts of strategic manipulations when they overcharge. 
 It was in part this judicial manipulative practice that contributed to the enactment of 
the "truth in sentencing" provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. People had 
become increasingly skeptical of the sentences that were publicly imposed because they 
always ended in early release. The new Act required that an offender serve at least 85% 
of the sentence imposed B an attempt to earn back some credibility for the system. 
 
The Insidious Danger of Shadow Vigilantism 
 One might argue that the manipulations and subversions inspired by shadow 
vigilantism – of both the official sort discussed in this chapter and of the citizen sort 
discussed in the previous chapter – are not something that, as a practical matter, ought to 
be of significant concern. We can for the most part ignore these problems because they 
are only a minor part of the criminal justice process.  
 It is true that some forms of shadow vigilantism may not be very common. For 
example, it is hard to get good data on the rate of shadow-vigilante-inspired jury 
nullification. But it is probably also true that shadow-vigilante-inspired subversions of the 
system that arise later in the adjudication process are sometimes limited in number only 
because of shadow-vigilante-inspired subversions earlier in the process, such as by 
citizens’ refusal to report or cooperate with the investigation of vigilante crimes, or by 
testilying by police officers, or by declinations by prosecutors to prosecute. That is, the 
rate of shadow-vigilante-inspired subversions later in the process, by jurors, prosecutors, 
or judges, might be dramatically higher if the cases for which shadow vigilantes have 
sympathy are not already subverted earlier in the process. 
 This is especially true in serious cases where the failure of justice would be 
spectacular if the system had not been manipulated by shadow vigilantes, since it is these 
cases in particular where the shadow vigilante impulse will be at its greatest. 
(Interestingly, then, it is shadow vigilantism that in some ways may be saving some of the 
justice-frustrating doctrines from themselves, by taking the edge off the credibility loss 
that the system would otherwise suffer if it were not subverted.) 
 An even better reason to take shadow vigilantism seriously is found in social 
psychology's insight that motivation is everything in setting a reputation.61 All that is 
needed to provoke the shadow vigilante's conclusion that the system is indifferent to the 
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importance of doing justice is an occasional headline case in which such apparent 
indifference is shown. When the outrageous failure of justice occurs, yet there is no 
indication that anyone is to be sanctioned for causing it, it becomes clear to the public that 
the outrageous result is authorized and approved by the system B it is how the system is 
supposed to work. With the system's apparent indifference established in this headline 
case, the observer can then easily assume that the same indifference motivates the 
system's decisions in the many other cases about which the observer never hears the 
details. 
 Finally, and most importantly, it is not the failure of justice itself that does the most 
serious damage to the system’s credibility but rather the threat of it, for this is what 
creates the shadow vigilante impulse. That is, it is the potential of a rule or practice to 
produce gross failures of justice that calls for the rule’s or practice’s subversion. The 
police would still testily to avoid a failure of justice even if they had been successful in 
avoiding such failures in every instance in the past. It is not the frequency of an outrage 
that is most important B each outrage is just an instance of their failure to prevent it 
through subversion B but rather the perceived threat of the outrage. If the threat of a 
serious failure of justice exists, so will the impulse to prevent it. 
 
Why Shadow Vigilantism Is More Dangerous and Destructive Than Classic 
Vigilantism 
 Indeed, it seems clear that shadow vigilantism is much more dangerous and 
destructive to the criminal justice system than classic vigilantism, for several reasons. 
First, the effect of shadow vigilantism is less dramatic but more pervasive. Shadow 
vigilantism appeals not just to the unusual person or group willing to be a classic vigilante 
B willing to openly violate the law in serious ways B but also to more ordinary people. Many 
people who cannot bring themselves to explicit lawlessness can bring themselves to 
undermine and subvert, through non-cooperation, lying, or other lower-level misconduct, 
a system that they see as being immorally indifferent to serious wrongdoing. Imagine all 
the neighbors in the Chapter 8 cases who refused to help authorities pursue the classic 
vigilantes. As we asked in Chapter 8: If those neighbors were sitting on a jury for those 
vigilantes, would they be likely to vote to acquit? If they were the grand jurors or 
prosecutor in the case, would they want to avoid bringing charges? If they were voting on 
a proposal to change the rules that led to the failure of justice, would they vote for the 
change and for a politician who supported the change? It seems highly likely that they 
would do so in all these instances. The fact that an entire neighborhood can show its 
willingness to succumb to a shadow vigilante impulse shows the potential sweep of the 
problem. 
 Further, shadow vigilantism is more problematic than the classic form because the 
criminal justice system cannot effectively deter it in the way it can classic vigilantism. The 
shadow vigilantes' conduct may be criminal in some cases, but it also may be only 
unethical or obviously unjust or unfair in others. The failure to report a crime or to assist 
investigators commonly is not a crime in the U.S.62 And even if it is criminal, it cannot be 
effectively deterred. Even if the shadow vigilantes' actions are not morally justified (under 
Chapter 5 rules), they may well believe that they are.63 They probably see themselves as 
civil disobedience protesters might see themselves: they know that what they are doing is 
inconsistent with the law in spirit if not in letter, but they see the violation as morally 
justified by the law's own immorality in its indifference to doing justice. 
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 Worse, while shadow vigilantism cannot be as effectively deterred as classic 
vigilantism, it is at the same time even more damaging than the latter. The classic 
vigilantism, by operating openly, serves as a public protest against the system's failures 
of justice B a call to the system to correct itself. In contrast, shadow vigilantism is generally 
unseen: jury nullification, improper exercise of discretion in changing, sentencing and 
other criminal justice decisions, political support for unjust punishment policies. It 
provides no public call for reform, but instead seeks to remain in the shadows 
 Further, it introduces into the criminal justice system serious arbitrariness and 
disparity among cases. The level of shadow vigilantism in any given case may be 
unpredictable, dependent as it is on a variety of factors. And the resulting arbitrariness 
and disparity only contribute in the long run to the system's reputation as being less 
predictable, more arbitrary, and more unjust. In other words, shadow vigilantism only 
serves to exacerbate the system's moral credibility problem that triggered it. It invites a 
downward spiral of lost credibility and therefore increased subversion. 
 In fact, the destructive dynamic of the downward spiral is even worse than this, as 
the next chapter details. 
  
Robinson, Vig Ch10 August 9, 2016 
 
 
 14 
NOTES 
                                            
1 This narrative was compiled from: People v. Bradford, 939 P.2d 259, (S. Ct. 
California 1997). 
2 People v. Bradford, “Cheryl V., Section E..” 
3 People v. Bradford, “3. Disappearance of Tracey Campbell.” 
4 People v. Bradford, “6. Defendants Second Arrest.” 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., “2. Defense Case.” 
7 For more details, see the Postscript. 
8 United States v. Sheard  
 9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 George C. Thomas III, “Lost in the Fog of Miranda,” Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 
64, Issue 5, 2013, 1501. 
12 Alan Dershowitz, The Best Defense, (New York, NY: Random House) 1982, xxi. 
13 Michelle Alexander; “Opinion: Why Police Lie Under Oath,” N.Y. Times Sunday 
Rev., Feb. 2, 2013, 4, quoting Peter Keane, SF Police Commissioner: APolice officer 
perjury in court to justify illegal dope searches is commonplace. One of the dirty little 
not-so-secret secrets of the criminal justice system is undercover narcotics officers 
intentionally lying under oath. It is a perversion of the American justice system that strikes 
directly at the rule of law. Yet it is the routine way of doing business in courtrooms 
everywhere in America.@. 
14 Larry Cunningham, “Taking on Testilying,” in Crime & Justice in America: 
Present Realities and Future Prospects, Second Edition, eds. Wilson R. Palacios, Paul F. 
Cromwell, and Roger G. Dunham (Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2002)  
15 Cunningham, “Taking on Testilying.” 
16 David Kocieniewski, “NY Pays a High Price for Police Lies,” N. Y. Times, Jan. 5, 
1997. 
17 Kocieniewski, “NY Pays a High Price.” 
18 Jon Loevy, “Truth or Consequences: Police ‘Testilying’ ", ABA Litigation, 36 
Spring 2010, 13-14, citing Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: 
An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1016 (1987). 
19 Myron W. Orfield, Jr., “Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts,” 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 75, 83 (1992) 
20 Milton Mollen, Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and 
the Anti-corruption Process of the Police Department, New York City, 1994. 
21 Mollen, “Commission to Investigate Allegations,” 36. 
22 Ibid., 38. 
23 Ibid., 38. 
24 Ibid., 38.  
25 Wayne Pethrick and Brent E. Turvey, ACognitive Ethos of the Forensic 
Examiner@, in Forensic Criminology, Wayne Pethrick, Brent E. Turvey, and Claire E. 
Ferguson eds. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2010), 118. 
26 Loevy, “Truth in Consequences”, 29. 
27 Case Comment, “Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search and Seizure 
Procedures in Narcotics Cases,” 4 Columbia J. Law & Soc. Probs., Vol 87, 1968, 94-95. 
28 Nick Malinowski, “Testilying: Cops Are Liars Who Get Away With Perjury,” 
Robinson, Vig Ch10 August 9, 2016 
 
 
 15 
                                                                                                                                            
Vice.com, March 2013, 
http://www.vice.com/read/testilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury . 
29 Alan Dershowitz, “A Police Badge is Not a License to Commit Perjury,” San 
Diego Union-Trib., Apr. 4, 1991, B11. 
30 Myron W. Orfield, Jr., “Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts,” U. Colo. L. Rev. 75, Vol. 63,1992. 
31 This narrative was compiled from Edecio Martinez, “Cash Rewards For Philly 
Rape Mob,” CBS News, June 11, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cash-rewards-for-philly-rape-mob/; Allison Steele, “Man 
Beaten by Kensington Mob Pleads Guilty in Rape of Girl,” The Inquirer, Aug. 12, 2010; 
http://articles.philly.com/2009-06-04/news/25284674_1_vigilante-justice-street-justice-jo
se-carrasquillo; Associated Press, “Man Suspected of Raping 11-Year-Old Girl Stable 
After Neighborhood Mob Takes Justice Into Own Hands,” NY Daily News (June 4, 2009) 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/man-suspected-raping-11-year-old-girl-stable-
neighborhood-mob-takes-justice-hands-article-1.372753. 
32 Martinez, “Cash Rewards For Philly.” 
33 Ibid. 
34 Steele, “Man Beaten by Kensington Mob.” 
35 Martinez, “Cash Rewards For Philly.” 
36 Ibid. 
37 This narrative was compiled from the following sources: Gus Burns, “Ramiro 
Sanchez Gets 6-Plus Years for Rape of Girl With Down Syndrome That Enraged 
Southwest Detroit,” Mlive, Mar. 28, 2014, 
http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2014/03/ramiro_sanchez_gets_6-plus_yea 
.html ; Erin Cawthon, “Detroit Man Beaten After Neighbors Say He Raped Teen, Cite 
Slow Police Response,” CNN, Aug. 14, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/14/us/michigan-suspect-beaten/ ; Jim Schaefer, “Detroit 
Neighborhood Takes Vigilante Action Against Rape Suspect,” Detroit Free Press, Aug. 
11, 2013, 
http://www.freep.com/article/20130811/NEWS01/308110005/hubbard-farms-rape-vigila
nte-justice-assault-teenage-girl . 
38 Schaefer, “Detroit Neighborhood Takes Vigilante Action.” 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Cawthon, “Detroit Man Beaten.” 
43 Ibid. 
44 One comment on a local forum states, Aso it=s OK to take the law into your own 
hands? And the people who beat him up weren=t arrested?@ Schaefer, “Detroit 
Neighborhood.” While another in response states AWhy is that even relevant? There 
should be No mercy. No compassion for the evil & wicked.@ Id. 
45 This narrative is compiled from State v. Augustine, 125 So. 3d 1203 (La.App. 4 
Cir. 2013); Eyewitness Morning News, “DA Frustrated By Revolving Door of Local 
Criminal Justice System,” WWLTV, Jan. 12, 2011, 
http://www.wwltv.com/eyewitness-morning-news/DA-Frustrated-by-revolving-door-of-loc
al-criminal-justice-system-113346474.html) . 
46 Eyewitness Morning News, “DA Frustrated.” 
Robinson, Vig Ch10 August 9, 2016 
 
 
 16 
                                                                                                                                            
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Cannizzaro is able to procure such a lengthy sentence because he asks the 
court to apply the habitual offender law, which increases penalties for individuals with 
prior felony convictions. In Louisiana, if the prosecutor determines a defendant should be 
charged under the habitual offender law and a jury finds them guilty, the judge=s hands 
are tied and they must impose the strictest sentences possible. Augustine appeals his 
lengthy sentence, but the appellate court affirms his 120 year sentence. 
 (https://casetext.com/case/state-v-augustine-50 ) 
50 Kyle Graham, “Overcharging,” 12 Ohio St. J. Of Crim. Law., Vol 11, No. 1, 2014, 
72. 
51 Douglas A. Berman, “Sentencing Law and Policy: an Affiliate of the Law 
Professor Blogs Network,” Mar. 19, 2013, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2013/03/overcharging.html 
(responding to the abstract posting of Graham, "Overcharging.”)  
52 For example, in the Illinois criminal code: 
Chapter 720 includes narrow, specific offenses in addition to a broader 
prohibition against such conduct generally. For example, although one provision in 
current Chapter 720 covers theft generally, a number of other provisions in 
Chapter 720 prohibit the same underlying conduct C theft by taking (or its attempt) 
C in the context of specific circumstances or forms of property. The same situation 
exists for assault offenses and property damage offenses. Similarly, in addition to 
its general perjury offense, current Illinois law contains numerous offenses 
criminalizing false statements made under oath or affirmation about particular 
matters, in particular documents, and in particular proceedings. 
“Final Report of the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission,” at xli 
(footnotes omitted). Kirk Dillard, a Republican state senator from Hinsdale, and a member 
of a later commission, acknowledged that lawmakers sometimes push for redundant 
measures in response to crimes within their districts. Dillard states, "[E]ven though there 
may have been five or six other ways to charge that individual who did something at a 
particular legislative district with a crime, the legislator always wants to add a new one for 
a lot of reasons, including public-relations purposesY We all add to the criminal code, and 
it turns into a hodge-podge." Mike Ramsey, “Panel tackles rewrite of state's criminal 
code,” Copley News. Serv., Dec. 13, 2004. 
53 See “Final Report of the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform 
Commission,” Vol. 1 at xix (August 2003) ("The sheer verbiage of current law is one 
indication of its failure to consolidate similar offensesYOverall, the Proposed Code's 
Special Part uses only 14.9 percent - less than 1/6 - of the words in the code's special 
Part, and only 6.7 percent - about 1/15 - of the current Special Part plus other, 
non-criminal code statutory felonies."); “Final Report of the Kentucky Penal Code 
Revision Project of the Criminal Justice Council,” Vol. 1,July 2003, xxix ("[N]early three 
decades of piecemeal modification of the Code have led to the addition of hundreds of 
new offenses, many of which cover the same conduct as previous offenses"). See also, 
Paul H. Robinson and Michael T. Cahill, “The Accelerating Degradation of American 
Criminal Codes,” Hastings L. J. Vol. 56, 2005, 635-636 ("One might expect that over time, 
as more loopholes or omissions in a code are eliminated, there would be a reduced need 
to alter or expand that code, but historical trends demonstrate that the opposite is 
Robinson, Vig Ch10 August 9, 2016 
 
 
 17 
                                                                                                                                            
trueYthe Illinois Code underwent nearly twice as many amendments in its second twenty 
years of existence than in its first twenty years."). 
54 The Commission's Report explained that "the drafters have aimed to 
consolidate offenses. Perhaps inevitably, four decades of piecemeal modification of the 
1961 Code have led to the addition of hundreds of new offenses, many of which cover the 
same conduct as previous offenses or appear in various other chapters of the Illinois 
Compiled Statutes rather than in the criminal code." “Final Report of the Illinois Criminal 
Code Rewrite and Reform Commission,” August 2003, at v-vi.  
55 Joseph Birkett, the most vocal prosecutor opposing the Criminal Code Rewrite 
and Reform Commission work contended that "many of the special provisions and 
enhanced penalties are needed." John Patterson, “Are we too tough on crime? 
Politicians' fear of appearing soft creates avalanche of laws,” Chi. Daily Herald, Apr. 1, 
2001. A Republican member of the Illinois House of Representatives and a member of the 
CLEAR commission (the prosecutor-sponsored successor to the original CCRRC), 
James B. Durkin, has acknowledged that, "[P]rosecutors are hesitant to change." Rep. 
James B. Durkin, “Court Reform Commentary,” Chi. Trib., June 27, 2000, 12. Gino DiVito, 
a former Illinois appellate judge who co-chaired the CLEAR commission, found that the 
code's illogic stems from laws passed to address a specific crime or a constituent 
complaint, without examining how the new law fits within the overall state code. "The code 
reform project had barely gotten off the ground when prosecutors expressed their 
opposition and were unwilling to devote manpower or resources to assist in the project, 
even though their participation would have assured them a voice within the 
decision-making group." Robinson, “The Accelerating Degradation,” 649. 
56 The 1,100-page bill emanating from the Criminal Law Edit, Alignment and 
Reform (ACLEAR@) Commission, inter alia, declined to recommend narrowing the number 
of circumstances that can activate the charge of aggravated battery. They also declined 
to eliminate anachronistic offenses such as adultery and fornication. Though, the last 
successful prosecution for fornication occurred in 1913, while the charge of adultery was 
last aired in criminal court in the early-1960s. Mike Ramsey, “Is that CLEAR? Legal panel 
hopes so,” Copley News Serv., Dec. 29, 2006. 
57 Graham, “Overcharging”, 705. 
58 Idid., 709. 
59 Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Sentencing Shift Gives new leverage to Prosecutors,” 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 2011. 
60 S. Rep. No. 225, at 46-47 ("Sentencing judges, trying to anticipate what the 
parole commission will do, undoubtedly are tempted to sentence a defendant on the basis 
of when they believe the parole commission will release him Y in doing so, some judges 
deliberately impose sentences above the parole guidelines, leaving the parole 
commission to set the presumptive release dateY other judges impose sentences 
consistent with or below the guidelines in order to retain control over the release date."). 
61 Paul Robinson and John Darley, “The Utility of Desert,” NW. U. L. REV., Vol 91, 
1997, 496. 
62 It can be a crime to lie to police or to refuse to answer questions before a grand 
jury. See, e.g., Brown v. United States 359 U.S. 41 (1959) (finding contempt where a 
witness refused to answer before a grand jury on grounds of self-incrimination privilege 
despite being granted immunity); but see Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) 
(Identifying a similar scenario where criminal contempt was not appropriate); Fed. R. 
Robinson, Vig Ch10 August 9, 2016 
 
 
 18 
                                                                                                                                            
Crim. P. 42 (a,b) (Criminal Contempt); 18 Pa. C.S.A. ' 4906 (False Reports to Law 
Enforcement Authorities). But shadow vigilantes can usually avoid committing such 
offenses simply by saying nothing to investigators in the first place and never drawing 
attention to themselves that might put them before a grand jury. 
63 Almost by definition, the shadow vigilante cannot meet the rules for the moral 
vigilante as laid out in Part III: they typically do not give prior warnings, as rule 6 requires; 
typically do not report afterwards what they have done and why, as rule 9 requires; and 
also commonly are each acting alone, as rule 8 forbids. However, a group might be 
formed to coordinate activities in ways that might come closer to meeting Part III's rules. 
An organization might publish guidelines and advice about what shadow vigilante actions 
people should take and why, and to report what is done and why. 
